The Torpedoes of World War II: The Mishaps and Those Involved in the Mishaps
During World War II, the U.S. Navy faced significant issues with the reliability and effectiveness of its Mk13 and Mk14 torpedoes. The blame for these problems often extended beyond any single individual, involving the procurement and development processes within the Navy.
The Faulty Design and Testing Processes
The Mk14 torpedo, in particular, was criticized for its faulty magnetic influence exploder. This exploder frequently failed to detonate when it should have. Extensive investigations revealed that the design and testing processes had significant flaws. The Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd) was found responsible for the torpedo's development.
The Role of Key Figures
Several key figures were involved in the program, including Admiral Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Captain A. M. G. K. T. K. Despite these issues, no specific individual was blamed for the failures. However, certain personnel and groups often exacerbated the problems, either through naivety or obstructionist behavior.
Robert Henry English, the commander for the early actions of the U.S. Pacific submarine fleet, was initially more inclined to believe BuOrd's claims that the problems lay with the submarine crews' mistake in approach or poor maintenance. English was later killed in an aircraft accident in 1943.
His successor, Charles Andrews Lockwood, was far more supportive of his captains and crews. Lockwood decided to take matters into his own hands and defied BuOrd to test the weapon on his own initiative. The results of these tests were conclusive, but BuOrd dismissed them, stating that the issue lay with improper trimming of the torpedoes.
BuOrd's Role and Obstructionism
BuOrd, despite evidence to the contrary, insisted that there was nothing wrong with the weapon until finally, under pressure from Admiral Nimitz, they conducted their own tests in August 1942. The root of the depth-setting problem was found to be the fault of BuOrd. When they increased the size of the warhead, which made the weapon heavier, they failed to make corresponding changes in the mechanism that controlled depth.
Other Suspects and Final Resolution
Beyond the obvious problems, other issues emerged, such as the premature detonation of the Mk14 torpedoes. BuOrd initially blamed the captains for poor approaches and maintenance, despite Nimitz's insistence on them testing their claims. BuOrd further obstructed efforts to fix the issue by forbidding any attempt to tamper with the Mark 6 detonator, a critical component at the time.
Despite these measures, the blame for the faulty torpedoes did not lie with a single person but rather with a collective failure, particularly BuOrd. Even when confronted with evidence, BuOrd consistently denied there was a problem and obstructed efforts to resolve it. Lockwood, realizing the seriousness of the situation, deactivated the magnetic detonator for his area and actively sought other solutions.
In the end, despite the presence of other individuals, such as Ralph Waldo Christie, who attempted to obstruct the fix, collective action from higher command, including Admiral King and Rear Admiral Kinkaid, eventually led to a resolution. Momsen's team found a temporary solution, but the process highlighted a need for better oversight and quality control in military procurement processes.