Physicalism and Universality: What Does Necessary Truth Imply?

Earl Pound's question “If physicalism is true, is it necessarily true in every possible world, or is it contingently true?” prompts us to explore the nuances of physicalist ontology. In this discussion, we will delve into the nature of the claim that reality is fundamentally physical, examining the implications of its necessity and contingency across different possible worlds.

The Nature of Physicalism

From a physicalist perspective, the world is fundamentally made up of physical substances, processes, and properties. This view is often contrasted with dualism and other metaphysical positions that postulate non-physical elements. Physicalists maintain that all phenomena can be explained in terms of physical forces and interactions, whether at the level of subatomic particles or complex biological systems.

Necessary Truth and Contingency

The distinction between necessary truth and contingency is crucial in understanding the nature of physicalism. A statement is necessarily true if it holds in every possible world, whereas it is contingent if it holds only in some possible worlds. Proponents of physicalism might argue that physicalism is a contingent truth, meaning that it is true only in our actual world, but not necessarily in all possible worlds.

Physicalism as a Contingent Truth

One compelling argument for the contingent nature of physicalism is the existence of other possible worlds where non-physical elements might play a significant role. For instance, consider a possible world entirely governed by cosmic consciousness. In such a world, physical phenomena might take a backseat to a more fundamental irreducible aspect that we might refer to as consciousness. If physicalism were a necessary truth, such a world would be impossible, which raises doubts about its necessity.

Physicalism as a Tautology

A strong piece of evidence supporting the contingent nature of physicalism is the possibility of reducing physicalism to a tautology. If we define physicalism as asserting that everything that exists is physical, then the statement is inherently redundant. For physicalism to be non-trivial and meaningful, we must define matter in such a way that it includes all fundamental aspects of reality, including consciousness where it seems to exist. In our actual world, observing that matter indeed seems to be fundamental supports the contingent truth of physicalism.

Physicalism and Its Logical Foundations

The logical framework within which physicalism operates is central to its status as a contingent truth. The question of whether physicalism must be true in every possible world hinges on how we construe the term “physical.” If all is physical, then all possible worlds must also be physical too. However, this does not make physicalism a necessary truth because it depends on the nature of the possible worlds we consider. Different possible worlds might have different fundamental aspects, which could include non-physical elements.

Furthermore, the nature of “possible” is a key logical concept. In modal logic, what is possible is that which is consistent with the axioms of the system being considered. This means that certain statements, like the existence of matter, are possible in a manner consistent with various physicalist and non-physicalist ontologies. The actual world is just one of many consistent systems.

Ayn Rand's Objectivism and Physicalism

Objectivist philosophy, as presented by Ayn Rand, argues for a different ontological stance. Rand and her followers argue against the monistic view of a universe with only matter, positing that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality. The three primary axioms of Objectivism—existence exists, consciousness is conscious, and A is A—serve as the foundation for this view.

Existence is a given, which can be verified through direct observation. Consciousness is the faculty that perceives existence, and it must be taken seriously as it allows us to understand and interact with the world. According to Rand, not only does existence exist, but the act of asserting that existence exists is itself an act of consciousness. This interplay between existence and consciousness is a critical point of distinction between objectivist philosophy and physicalism.

Conclusion: The Contingency of Physicalism

In conclusion, the debate over whether physicalism is a necessary truth or a contingent truth highlights the complexity and nuance of metaphysical claims. While physicalism is a powerful explanatory framework in our actual world, the existence of possible worlds with different fundamental attributes suggests that physicalism is more likely to be contingent. The nature of consciousness, as explored in Objectivist philosophy, further complicates this issue, offering an alternative ontological stance that challenges the primacy of physical explanation.

Understanding the contingent nature of physicalism does not diminish its explanatory power in our actual world. Instead, it encourages a broader intellectual landscape where multiple metaphysical perspectives coexist and enrich our understanding of reality.