Metaphysical Necessity: A Foundation of Possible Worlds

Metaphysical necessity forms the bedrock upon which discussions about the nature of existence and the possible worlds are built. It is a concept that deals with truths that are not contingent on empirical evidence but are considered necessary in an absolute sense. This article delves into the relationship between metaphysical necessity and possible worlds, examining whether such necessity is contingent on all possible states.

Understanding Metaphysical Necessity

To understand metaphysical necessity, it is helpful to first define what it is not. Unlike empirical necessity, which relies on observable and measurable phenomena, metaphysical necessity is concerned with truths that are independent of the physical world. These are truths that, if violated, would result in contradictions or logical inconsistencies.

A prime example of metaphysical necessity is mathematical truths, such as the statement that 2 24. This truth is not contingent on empirical evidence but is a necessary part of the logical structure of the universe. Similarly, logical truths like “if A, then A” are also metaphysically necessary, as they cannot be otherwise without violating the laws of logic.

The Concept of Possible Worlds

The concept of possible worlds is a powerful tool for understanding metaphysical necessity. A possible world is a complete and consistent set of propositions that makes it a genuine alternative to our actual world. These worlds are complete in the sense that they contain all the particulars and objects that exist in them, along with the relations between them.

In multiple possible worlds, different configurations of reality can occur, but they are all constrained by the same laws of logic and mathematics. For instance, in one possible world, a person might have turned out differently, but they still retain the essential metaphysical properties that are necessary for their existence. In other words, the laws of logic and mathematics are metaphysically necessary and apply to all possible worlds.

Metaphysical Necessity and Contingency

The question of whether metaphysical necessity is contingent on all possible worlds can be approached by examining the nature of contingency itself. Contingency refers to something that is not necessary but could have been otherwise. For example, if a particular event in the past had turned out differently, it would not have contradicted any necessary truths but would have upset the actual chain of events.

However, when considering metaphysical necessity, we are dealing with truths that are not contingent on specific configurations of the physical world. These truths are self-evident and immutable. As stated by RRM, “contingent necessity” is a contradiction in terms. Self-contradictory states cannot exist because they erase logical coherence. For example, it is impossible for a statement to be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect, as this would violate the laws of logic.

Rephrasing the Question

RRM suggests rephrasing the question to “Is metaphysical necessity a conditional part of every possible state of affairs.” This rephrasing shifts the focus from the nature of metaphysical necessity itself to the conditions under which it applies. The answer to this question is no. Metaphysical necessity is not conditional on different possible states but is rather a fundamental aspect of the universe that applies universally.

In the context of possible worlds, if a world is coherent and consistent with the laws of logic and mathematics, it must necessarily adhere to these metaphysical necessities. These necessities are not dependent on the particular configurations of the physical world but are baked into the very framework of existence.

Theology and Metaphysical Necessity

The theological context of this discussion is also important. The belief in metaphysical necessity can be seen in many religious traditions. For instance, the Christian belief in Christ’s resurrection is not contingent on empirical evidence but is a fundamental metaphysical truth. The statement “Christ is risen” is not contingent but is a necessary part of the theological framework that underlies Christian belief.

However, as the statement “No. ‘Contingent necessity’ is contradictory. Self-contradictory states cannot exist” suggests, metaphysical necessity cannot coexist with contingency without violating logical principles. This is why the concept of Christ’s resurrection, while it may seem contingent in certain contexts, is actually a necessary truth within the theological framework.

Conclusion

In conclusion, metaphysical necessity is not contingent on all possible worlds. Instead, it is a fundamental aspect of the universe that applies independently of specific configurations of reality. This means that in every possible world, the laws of logic and mathematics hold, and the necessary truths inherent in these laws are consistent across all possible states of affairs. The rephrasing of the original question to “Is metaphysical necessity a conditional part of every possible state of affairs” highlights the importance of distinguishing between necessary truths and contingent events.