How Nazi Germany Portrayed the War to the Public in 1943-45: Propaganda and Desperation
The final three years of World War II saw a dramatic shift in the Nazi regimersquo;s strategy and propaganda as they struggled to maintain morale and secure a victory that had seemed inevitable. This period, from 1943 to 1945, is a critical chapter in understanding how effective and manipulative propaganda can be in a time of great adversity.
Doom Number One: Unconditional Surrender
During the pivotal years of 1943-1945, the Nazi regime faced a series of overwhelming challenges on multiple fronts. The Allied forces, led by the United States and Great Britain, and later joined by the Soviet Union, had the upper hand, and seemed destined to win the war. In this context, the concept of unconditional surrender posed a significant threat. Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, portrayed the last two years of the war as a fight to the bitter end, emphasizing the dire situation.
He presented it as a war of annihilation, not just targeting the Nazi regime but also the German people. Given the Allied statement of unconditional surrender, Goebbels saw no alternative but to fight until the last man. The DoD Morgenthau Plan and the Morgenthau Report further underscored the dire prospects, suggesting the decimation of Germanyrsquo;s industrial capacity and potential mass starvation. This presented an existential threat that could not be ignored.
Hope Number One: Wunderwaffen
Despite the grim reality, Goebbels tried to instill hope in the German public by emphasizing the technological superiority of Germanyrsquo;s weapons and accelerated developments in rocket and jet aircraft. These so-called Wunderwaffen, or ldquo;miracle weapons,rdquo; included the V-1 and V-2 rockets and the Me 262 jet fighter. These weapons were impressive in their propaganda and were intended to influence the public by making them believe that German technology would overcome the numerical superiority of the Allied forces.
However, the reality on the ground was different. As Allied air power strengthened, cinema and other forms of media were largely destroyed by bombings, reducing the propagandarsquo;s effectiveness. This period marked a significant decline in the regimersquo;s ability to convey the narrative of technological and military superiority consistently.
Doom Number Two: The Morgenthau Report
The Morgenthau Report, released in August 1944, detailed plans to reduce Germany to an agricultural level, similar to 18th-century standards, with the potential for mass starvation. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau declared that the Allied objective was to make Germany ?????ests a land for farming, a nation of cattle rather than of people. This proposition was a catastrophic threat to the German populace and their national identity. Goebbels seized on this opportunity, portraying Allied victory as a prelude to a terrifying future in which Germany would become nothing more than a potato patch.
The implications of the Morgenthau Plan were clear: the collapse of the German economy and survival at the brink of starvation were imminent. Goebbelsrsquo; propaganda capitalized on this fear, emphasizing the horrors that awaited the German people if they were to lose the war. This narrative aimed to instill a sense of urgency and a willingness to fight until the bitter end.
Hope Number Two: Allied Involvement Against the Soviet Union
Goebbelsrsquo; desperation extended to seeking an unlikely alliance with the Western Allies against the Soviet Union. He believed that the Western Allies, led by Britain and the United States, would reconsider their stance and recognize the dangers posed by the advancing Red Army. Until the final stages of the war, Goebbels persisted in his attempts to convince the Allies that the Soviet Union posed a greater threat than Nazi Germany.
Even in the closing months of the war, as Soviet forces approached Berlin, Goebbels maintained this hope. However, it never materialized, and the Allied powers continued to pursue a policy of unconditional surrender, further deepening the despair and fear within the German populace.
Conclusion: The Transition from External to Internal Terror
Hitler often declared that ldquo;terrorrdquo; was an essential element in creating the conditions for victory. Initially, this terror was directed against Germanyrsquo;s enemies. However, as the war dragged on, the moments of hope for the German people diminished, prompting a shift in focus. The terror shifted to the German people themselves, emphasizing the horrors of defeat and the ultimate effort required to secure final victory.
Ultimately, the narrative of final victory was realized, but not for Nazi Germany. The Allied victory brought about the collapse of the Nazi regime and the rebuilding of Germany.
Recommended Reading
Fleming, Thomas. The New Dealersrsquo; War: F.D.R. the War Within World War II. Basic Books, 2001.